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Deciphering  
Russia’s “Sovereign 
Internet Law”
Tightening Control and  
Accelerating the Splinternet
KEY FACTS
In November 2019, Vladimir Putin’s regime introduced new  
regulations that create a legal framework for centralized state 
management of the internet within Russia’s borders. Although full 
implementation will be extremely difficult, this framework will likely 
lead to tighter state control over society and additional compli-
cations for domestic and foreign companies. The regulations are 
expected to accelerate the fragmentation of the global internet 
and to increase Russian reliance on Chinese technology.
 – Germany and the EU should assess the risks and long-term 
implications of Russia’s new internet legislation for European 
companies and civil society actors.
 – EU institutions, particularly the European Commission with its 
geopolitical focus and ambitions, need to consider devising 
mechanisms to protect the companies and civil society actors of 
EU member states from disadvantages created by Russia’s new 
regulations. 
 – Germany and the EU should actively promote the advantages 
of the global internet and involve major stakeholders, civil  
society actors, and business entities in a broad discussion on 
how to sustain and enhance its future.
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ANALYSIS
THE NEW “SOVEREIGN 
INTERNET LAW”
New regulations on the internet in Russia, most of 
which came into force on November 1, 2019 and oth-
ers of which are due to follow in January 2021, have 
attracted international attention and been described 
publicly as Russia’s “sovereign internet law.” In fact, 
there was no such new law, but rather a series of 
amendments to the existing federal laws “On Com-
munication” and “On Information, Information Tech-
nologies, and Information Protection.”
Officially, the amendments aim to protect the in-
ternet within Russia from external threats. In fact, 
they provide the crucial legal framework for creat-
ing a centralized management system of the internet 
by the state authority – theoretically enabling the 
isolation of Russia’s network from the global inter-
net. These three amendments have particularly far 
reaching implications: 
 - The compulsory installation of technical equipment 
for counteracting threats
 - Centralized management of telecommunication net-
works in case of a threat and a control mechanism 
for connection lines crossing the border of Russia 
 - The implementation of a Russian national Domain 
Name System (DNS)
RUSSIA’S GOALS
With these three key amendments, Russia is trying to 
achieve at least three different goals. First, it aims to 
create a mechanism for effective surveillance of the 
internet within its borders. To this end, the amend-
ment concerning the installation of “technical equip-
ment for counteracting threats,” allows for greater 
state control of information and the prevention of its 
dissemination if needed. Consequently, implemen-
tation of the new legislation may give the Russian 
government the opportunity to curtail opposition 
activity on social media sites, helping it to prevent 
protests such as those in 2011 through 2013 ahead 
of elections to Russia’s parliament, the State Du-
ma, scheduled for 2021 and the presidential election 
scheduled for 2024. Even if this amendment is tech-
nically difficult to implement, as will be explained 
below, the law itself is a part of the Putin regime’s 
continuing intimidation strategy and it will impact 
Russian society.
Second, the state aims to become the key regula-
tor of the internet in Russia. The recent amend-
ment allowing the state to create centralized control 
over the internet infrastructure by introducing the 
cross-border control of connection lines and the re-
routing of traffic is an attempt to enable the isola-
tion of a national network from the global internet 
– for which the state can open and close “digital bor-
ders” and determine the flow of information within 
them as it sees fit. While total state control of Rus-
sia’s internet will remain impossible so long as the 
country is connected to the world via the existing 
infrastructure of the global internet, the passing of 
this amendment by Putin’s regime was an attempt to 
present its control of telecommunication lines, net-
works, and traffic as a fait accompli. 
Third, Russia intends to expand the state-centered 
model of the internet at the international level. The 
amendment aiming to create the infrastructure for 
a national Domain Name System (DNS) could, if 
achieved as planned in January 2021, create a Rus-
sian segment of the internet – parallel to and prob-
ably not compatible with the existing one. With this 
move, Russia is not seeking to isolate itself from the 
rest of world, but rather to create a precedent, which 
other states aspiring to sovereignty over their seg-
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ments of the internet could follow. Presumably, Russia will 
need to cooperate even more closely with China than it has 
already to develop the technology to achieve its goals and 
coordinate its internet policy at the international level. In 
the long term, such cooperation could lead to the fractur-
ing of the global internet and a shift of stakeholders and 
powers.
RISKS TO OTHERS
Although some implications of the three amendments are 
still unclear and some regulations and requirements are not 
yet in place, the new legislation already carries concrete 
risks, which concern not only Russia itself, but also Germa-
ny and other European countries that cooperate with Rus-
sia and own companies operating within it.
The now compulsory “technical equipment for counteract-
ing threats” will, for example, also be able to prioritize traf-
fic. It can delay the flow of certain types of network packets 
while prioritizing others, giving them better performance. 
In practical terms, users of particular websites and services 
could experience slow access or unavailability. Such prior-
itization could compromise network neutrality and lead to 
discrimination against companies not protected by the Rus-
sian state.
The fact that neither technical requirements nor certifica-
tion for this new equipment exist also means that network 
failures are likelier to happen. Companies operating in Rus-
sia could, in turn, suffer collateral damage caused by the new 
equipment with limited possibilities for recouping losses.
In addition, the likelier prospect of the so-called “splin-
ternet,” where segments of the internet are controlled and 
regulated by different states and actors, could lead to in-
compatibility among technical, regulatory, and operation-
al standards – thus impeding cross-border cooperation and 
the interoperability of the global internet.
1 Andrei Soldatov, “Security First, Technology Second: Putin Tightens his Grip on Russia’s Internet – With China’s Help,” DGAP Kompakt, Nr. 3, March 2019, <https://dgap.org/
system/files/article_pdfs/2019-03-dgapkompakt.pdf > (accessed January 6, 2020).
2 For more on the legislation restricting the internet see the Reporter Without Borders’ report “Taking Control? Internet Censorship And Surveillance In Russia,” November 
2019, < https://www.reporter-ohne-grenzen.de/fileadmin/Redaktion/Downloads/Berichte/2019/Russiareport_20191128.pdf> (accessed January 6, 2020).
3 “Even without an Internet ‘nuclear option,’ Russian intelligence has been using an existing law to try to access RuNet user data for months. Here’s how”; Meduza, April 23, 
2019, <https://meduza.io/en/cards/even-without-an-internet-nuclear-option-russian-intelligence-has-been-using-an-existing-law-to-try-to-access-runet-user-data-for-
months-here-s-how> (accessed January 6, 2020).
4 Yana Belyaeva, “Will YouTube, Facebook, and Instagram be banned in Russia?” [in Russian], Deutsche Welle, September 24, 2019, <https://www.dw.com/ru/забанят-ли-в-
россии-youtube-facebook-и-instagram/a-50544905> (accessed January 6, 2020).
5 Reethika Ramesh et al., “Decentralized Control: A Case Study of Russia,” University of Michigan, November 6, 2019, pp. 2–3, <https://news.umich.edu/how-russias-online-
censorship-could-jeopardize-internet-freedom-worldwide/> (accessed January 6, 2020).
6 Ibid., p. 3.
7 Ibid., p. 2.
8 “Powers of Roskomnadzor,” Roskomnadzor, January 29, 2013, <http://eng.rkn.gov.ru/about/powers_of_roskomnadzor/> (accessed January 6, 2020).
9 “VPN services refuse to comply with Roskomnadzor’s requirements” [in Russian], Roskomsvoboda, March 29, 2019, <https://roskomsvoboda.org/46149/> (accessed 
January 6, 2020).
CENTRALIZING STATE CONTROL OVER 
THE DECENTRALIZED INTERNET
Russia has a long-standing information and internet poli-
cy through which it has already attempted to control the 
internet in previous years, as was also described in a re-
cent DGAP paper by Andrei Soldatov1 (see Infobox on page 
4). But, in current practice, the state authorities apply the 
restrictive internet laws that already exist in Russia2 selec-
tively for two reasons. First, due to the lack of technical ca-
pability, some of the laws cannot be implemented. 3 Second-
ly, certain internet services and applications are so popular 
that the state does not block them in order to avoid public 
discontent.4 
Generally speaking, in order to gain more influence over 
a domestic internet, state authorities can implement cen-
tralized and decentralized control mechanisms. Which one 
to choose is mainly defined by the network infrastructure 
and the amount of control countries possess over their net-
works.5  China, for example, opts for centralized control; the 
country brought internet service providers (ISPs) under its 
yoke early on and traffic is guided through “choke points,” 
network nodes through which data travels when entering 
or exiting a country’s internal network. Countries such as 
the United Kingdom, India, and Russia currently have much 
less control over their networks and domestic ISPs. In their 
case, a decentralized approach is favorable. Authorities 
roll out new laws and policy measures and oblige ISPs to 
comply.6 Up to this point, Russia was “the largest and most 
aggressive” country pursuing decentralized control,7 as 
demonstrated by the laws enacted since 2012 regulating the 
internet. The new amendments introduced in 2019 aim to 
give Russian authorities more centralized powers. Roskom-
nadzor – the Federal Service for Supervision of Communi-
cations, Information Technology, and Mass Media – and the 
central point for control over communication networks and 
facilities as well as personal data in Russia,8  wants to moni-
tor traffic at its source, without having an ISP in between or 
internet services that do not comply with new regulations.9 
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Apparently, Russia is now attempting to catch up with what 
China quickly implemented in the early days of the internet: 
centralized and effective control mechanisms at the root of 
the network.
RUSSIA’S INFORMATION  
AND INTERNET POLICY
One of the first laws was passed in reaction to a series 
of mass protests in 2011 through 2013. The protests 
were against manipulation of the parliamentary 
election and the so-called rokirovka – the position 
swap between then President Dmitri Medvedev 
and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin. The opposition 
made wide use of the internet to bring people to the 
streets. As a reaction from the state, in 2012, a law 
on a unified register of banned websites came into 
force.10 The register initially included sites containing 
child pornography and drugs. But less than two years 
later, in 2014, it was amended to include websites 
promoting rioting or containing extremist content or 
participation in mass public events.11
Since 2015, all domestic and foreign internet companies 
are obliged to ensure the recording, systematization, 
accumulation, and storage of the personal data of 
Russian citizens on servers physically located within 
Russia.12 
In 2016, Yarovaya’s Law (named after Irina Yarovaya, a 
member of the party United Russia in the State Duma 
and co-author of the legislation) came into force. 
Since then, telecommunication companies have been 
required to store the content of text messages, phone 
conversations, images, and videos for six months, as 
well as their metadata for three years within Russian 
territory. They must provide this information to securi-
ty services upon request.13
10 Resolution of the Government of the Russian Federation No. 1101 dated October 26, 2012 (Moscow) “On the Unified Automated Information System ‘Unified Register of 
Domain Names, Indexes of Pages of Websites in the Information and Telecommunication Network ‘Internet’ and Network Addresses that Allow Identification of Websites in the 
Information and Telecommunication Network ‘Internet’ containing information the dissemination of which is prohibited in the Russian Federation’” [in Russian], Rossiyskaya 
Gazeta, October 29, 2012, <https://rg.ru/2012/10/29/reestr-dok.html> (accessed January 6, 2020).
11 “On the entry into force of amendments to the Federal Law ‘On Information, Information Technologies, and Information Protection’” [in Russian], Roskomnadzor, January 31, 
2014, <https://rkn.gov.ru/news/rsoc/news23647.htm> (accessed January 6, 2020).
12 “Processing and storage of personal data in the Russian Federation. Changes from September 1, 2015” [in Russian], Ministry of Digital Development, Communications and 
Mass Media of the Russian Federation, February 12, 2016, <https://digital.gov.ru/en/personaldata/> (accessed January 6, 2020).
13 “Federal law No. 374-FZ dated July 6, 2016 about making changes to the federal law ‘on counterterrorism’ and certain legislative acts of the Russian Federation in terms 
of establishing additional countermeasures to terrorism and public security” [in Russian], Rossiyskaya Gazeta, July 8, 2016, <https://rg.ru/2016/07/08/antiterror-dok.html> 
(accessed January 6, 2020).
14 Article 46, Federal Law No. 90-FZ dated May 1, 2019 “On Amendments to the Federal Law ‘On Communications’ and the Federal Law ‘On Information, Information 
Technologies, and Information Protection’” [in Russian], Official Internet Portal for Legal Information, May 1, 2019, <http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/
View/0001201905010025?index=2&rangeSize=1> (accessed January 6, 2020).
15 Ibid., article 651
16 Maria Kolomychenko, “Nokia’s former head in Russia will implement ‘sovereign Runet’ systems” [in Russian], RBK, September 26, 2019, <https://www.rbc.ru/technology_
and_media/26/09/2019/5d8b4c1c9a7947d3c58f9a48> (accessed January 6, 2020).
17 “Russia will check the means to block Telegram on users in Tyumen – sources” [in Russian], Reuters, September 13, 2019, <https://ru.reuters.com/article/topNews/
idRUKCN1VY1U1-ORUTP> (accessed January 6, 2020).
18 Ilya Khrennikov, Stepan Kravchenko, “Putin Wants His Own Internet,” Bloomberg, March 5, 2019, <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-03-05/vladimir-putin-
wants-his-own-internet> (accessed January 6, 2020).
19 Post by Pavel Durov on the social network platform “VK,” April 16, 2018, <https://vk.com/wall1_2296940> (accessed January 6, 2020).
20 Mikhail Zelensky, “Russia is trying to block Telegram, but it’s failing. Why?”, Meduza, April 17, 2018, <https://meduza.io/en/cards/russia-is-trying-to-block-telegram-but-it-
s-failing-why> (accessed January 6, 2020).
21 See note 16: Kolomychenko, “Nokia’s former head in Russia will implement ‘sovereign Runet’ systems.”
IMPLICATIONS OF THREE 
KEY AMENDMENTS
Below the implications of three key amendments included 
in the new regulations are explained in detail.
1. The Compulsory Installation of Technical Equipment 
for Counteracting Threats
This amendment requires all internet service providers to 
install “technical equipment for counteracting threats to 
stability, security, and the functional integrity of the inter-
net on the territory of the Russian Federation” (TSPU) on 
their networks.14 The legislation does not specify which 
technical equipment should be used. Although, at this writ-
ing, there has still been no official decree on this equipment 
and its technical requirements, the articles of this amend-
ment state that Roskomnadzor will provide it to ISPs free of 
charge.15 The technology will apparently be installed nation-
wide by a single company called “Data – Processing and Au-
tomation Center”16 and controlled by Roskomnadzor.
The past attempt by the Russian state to block Telegram,17 
a cloud-based messaging app, provides a good example of 
how the regime is attempting to use this amendment to 
prevent unrestricted communication that could be utilized 
to coordinate social unrest and opposition movements.18 
Telegram claims to allow the secure exchange of informa-
tion through end-to-end encryption, which makes commu-
nication possible without intelligence services being able to 
read it. In 2018, according to the founder of the company 
Pavel Durov, Telegram had over 15 million users in Russia.19 
In its attempt to block Telegram, Roskomnadzor tried to 
ban the IP addresses of Telegram servers without success.20 
In order to finally ban the service21 and prevent undisclosed 
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communication, Russian authorities might use, 
among others, a technology commonly referred to as 
Deep Packet Inspection (DPI). This new amendment 
obliges ISPs to accept and cooperate in the installa-
tion process of DPI systems or a similar technology.
DEEP PACKET INSPECTION
The main technical components of DPI 
systems are so-called black boxes, which are 
installed at the hubs of internet providers to 
analyze both data packets and the content of 
communications. They enable the monitoring, 
filtering, and slowdown of requests as well 
as the blocking of specific content. The black 
boxes can also determine to which service or 
application each data packet is attributed. 
Although DPI systems have been used in 
Russia since 2012, when legislation creating 
an internet blacklist was enacted,22 ISPs have 
yet to introduce them widely because of their 
high cost, which they had to bear themselves.
Anonymous sources have told the BBC that DPI sys-
tems, which have already been tested on the net-
works of all major mobile network operators in the 
Ural region,23 are indeed Roskomnadzor’s choice.24 
While it can therefore be assumed that the imple-
mentation of the TSPU amendment will be based, at 
least in part, on the use of Deep Packet Inspection 
technology – the exact specifications, capabilities, 
and effectiveness of which are unknown – it might 
also include other hardware and software solutions, 
which are also unknown at this time.
Even Encrypted Connections Might Be Blocked
If Roskomnadzor widely implements DPI systems or 
similar technologies, they might be used to block 
undesired traffic and severely censor the Russian 
web. One might think that DPI systems cannot iden-
tify, and therefore block, packets of encrypted con-
nections such as HyperText Transfer Protocol Se-
cure (HTTPS),25 which is widely used on the World 
22 Andrei Soldatov, Irina Borogan, “The Kremlin’s New Internet Surveillance Plan Goes Live Today,” Wired, November 1, 2012, <https://www.wired.
com/2012/11/russia-surveillance/> (accessed January 6, 2020).
23 See note 16: Kolomychenko, “Nokia’s former head in Russia will implement ‘sovereign Runet’ systems”; and note 17: “Russia will check the means to 
block Telegram on users in Tyumen – sources.”
24 Andrey Zakharov, Svetlana Reyter, “Roskomnadzor will introduce a new Telegram blocking technology for 20 billion rubles” [in Russian], BBC, December 
18, 2018. <https://www.bbc.com/russian/features-46596673> (accessed January 6, 2020).
25 David Naylor et al., “The Cost of the ‘S’ in HTTPS,” Proceedings of the 10th ACM International Conference on emerging Networking Experiments and 
Technologies CoNEXT, December 14, 2014, pp. 133–140, <https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/76526401.pdf> (accessed January 6, 2020).
26 “HTTPS encryption on the web” [in German], Google transparency report, <https://transparencyreport.google.com/https/overview> (accessed January 
6, 2020).
27 Hakan Tanriverdi, “A decision by Google and Amazon, which will delight censors” [in German], Sueddeutsche Zeitung, May 2, 2018, <https://www.
sueddeutsche.de/digital/it-sicherheit-eine-entscheidung-von-google-und-amazon-die-zensoren-freuen-wird-1.3965101> (accessed January 6, 2020).
Wide Web.26 Unfortunately, this is not entirely the 
case. Because data packets – even those sent via an 
encrypted connection – are always sent to a certain 
destination, they must always carry an address that 
is visible. This information cannot be encrypted be-
cause an ISP would otherwise not know to which 
address it is supposed to send the user’s request. For 
example, an ISP will know that a user is requesting 
data from YouTube, the size of the request, and its 
length. But, thanks to encryption, it will not know 
which specific video the user is watching.
For Russian authorities, the package destination 
might be indicator enough to block requests from 
undesired websites. One possible solution would be 
for a user to hide the address of the packet he or she 
wishes to send by redirecting it through a Virtual 
Private Network (VPN). In this case, the user doesn’t 
communicate directly with the ISP but through one 
or several entities in between. This makes the des-
tination of the request only visible to the VPN ser-
vice provider but not the ISP. But, since Russian au-
thorities are also trying to use DPI systems or similar 
technologies to shut down VPN services, this work-
around may sooner or later cease to be a viable 
option.
Another workaround in current use is a technique 
called “domain fronting,” with which a request gets 
redirected on the same server after a HTTPS con-
nection has been established. This technique, among 
others, was used by Telegram to bypass Roskom-
nadzor’s IP bans. However, this workaround, too, is 
becoming more difficult to implement as compa-
nies such as Amazon or Google, which operate serv-
ers also used for domain fronting, seek to end this 
practice.27 
Traffic Speeds May Be Prioritized and  
Discriminated
DPI or similar technologies can also be used to pri-
oritize and discriminate traffic. Prioritizing traffic 
could have far-reaching consequences for net neu-
trality, especially if it is carried out by a state author-
ity. Roskomnadzor could slow down the traffic speed 
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of all unknown or undesired connections and priori-
tize trusted connections of entities that comply with 
the fixed rules.28 
European telecommunication operators may have 
confirmed that such prioritization and discrimina-
tion of traffic works. Larger ISPs – including Deut-
sche Telekom – are suspected of using DPI for com-
mercial purposes in order to control traffic speeds 
to block intensive forms of consumption (for ex-
ample streaming) that are not included in a user’s 
contract.29  And if ISPs can slow down connections, 
Roskomnadzor could do the same in order to put 
enormous pressure on companies that do not com-
ply with its fixed rules. If a state authority massive-
ly slows down some connections, targeted compa-
nies could face issues that threaten their businesses. 
These could include seeing a marked decrease in 
their user base as customers dissatisfied with the 
inconvenience of substantially slower services are 
pushed toward alternatives.
If this amendment is fully implemented, bypassing 
DPI services and accessing restricted areas of the in-
ternet will be very difficult except for highly skilled 
users, leading to an “asymmetry of blocking effec-
tiveness.”30 Since it must be assumed that IT special-
ists can circumvent DPI systems, the amendment’s 
official goal – repulsing threats – is not entirely plau-
sible. In other words, it is likelier that the primary 
target of wide implementation of DPI is Russia’s ordi-
nary users, whose internet use will assuredly be re-
stricted. Private companies might also be targeted to 
cause them economic disadvantages.
28 Maria Kolomychenko, “Roskomnadzor proposed testing Runet for ‘sovereignty’” [in Russian], RBK, March 28, 2019, <https://www.rbc.ru/technology_
and_media/28/03/2019/5c9cdfa09a79473d7d241980> (accessed January 6, 2020).
29 Thomas Lohninger, et al., “The Net Neutrality Situation in the EU,” Epicenter Works, January 29, 2019, pp. 39–40, <https://epicenter.works/sites/
default/files/2019_netneutrality_in_eu-epicenter.works-r1.pdf> (accessed January 6, 2020).
30 Philipp Winter, et al., “ScrambleSuit: A Polymorph Network Protocol to Circumvent Censorship,” Arxiv Cornell University (New York), May 14, 2013, 
<https://arxiv.org/pdf/1305.3199.pdf> (accessed January 6, 2020).
31 See note 14: Article 651 of “Federal Law No. 90-FZ.”
32 “On approval of the procedure for centralized management of the public communication network” [in Russian], Federal portal of draft regulatory legal 
acts, <https://regulation.gov.ru/projects#npa=91558> (accessed January 6, 2020).
33 Ibid., article 2.
34 Article 2, “Order of the Federal Service for Supervision of Communications, Information Technologies, and Mass Communications No. 224 
dated July 31, 2019 ‘On the Approval of the Rules for Routing Telecommunication Messages in the Case of Centralized Management of a Public 
Communication Network’” [in Russian], Official internet portal for legal information, November 6, 2019, <http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/
View/0001201911060018?index=2&rangeSize=1> (accessed January 6, 2020).
35 Ibid., article 4.
36 Ibid., article 5.
2. Centralized Management of Telecommunication 
Networks in Case of a Threat and a Control Mech-
anism for Connection Lines Crossing the Border of 
Russia
This new amendment states that the media regulator 
Roskomnadzor can take over the centralized man-
agement of the network31 in case of a “threat.” The 
three main threats are defined in a government de-
cree on the “centralized management of a public 
communications network,”32 which is currently still 
in its development phase and has not yet entered in-
to force. These threats are:
1. to the integrity of the network, for example when 
no connection can be established between users;
2. to the stability of the network, for example when 
equipment does not work correctly or is disabled 
due to natural or man-made disasters;
3. to the safety of the functioning of the network, for 
example when hackers attack the network and ISPs 
cannot resist the attack, or when ISPs themselves 
cause disruption.33 
If any of these threats materialize, Russian ISPs will 
have to comply with the rules fixed by Roskom-
nadzor, which then prohibit the routing of telecom-
munication messages through communication net-
works located outside of the territory of the Russian 
Federation.34 In addition, when two autonomous sys-
tems wish to communicate with each other, they will 
have to do so through traffic exchange and connec-
tion points35 monitored by Roskomnadzor. The agen-
cy can ask any ISP or person running an autonomous 
system to “change the routes of telecommunication 
messages” and guide those messages through “tech-
nical means to counteract threats to the stability, 
security, and integrity of the functioning of the […] 
internet.”36 
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Furthermore, this new amendment creates a control 
mechanism for connection lines crossing the border 
of the Russian Federation. All owners of such com-
munication lines are obliged to report not only their 
purpose, but also which facilities exist on that line to 
Roskomnadzor.37 
The Danger of a Kill-Switch
The aforementioned stipulations give state authori-
ties the potential to create a “kill-switch,” a relative-
ly easy to use mechanism that can be used to shut 
down most of the Russian internet. In the event of 
such a shutdown, even DPI bypass systems, VPNs, or 
other unidentified connections will not work – com-
munication becomes physically impossible.
The global internet is strong and redundant because 
its traffic is handled by a web of computers and serv-
ers; data can therefore take many different paths in 
order to reach its destination. The amount of cen-
tralized traffic exchange and choke points strong-
ly affects the power of a government to censor and 
repress data flows.38 The lower the amount of choke 
points, the more easily they can be controlled.
With implementation of this new amendment, Rus-
sian authorities will weaken the robust structure of 
the Russian internet by guiding traffic through cen-
tralized, state-controlled connection points, which 
can be shut down in case of a “threat.” Russian au-
thorities might soon be able to cut off major parts 
37 See note 14: Article 56² of “Federal Law No. 90-FZ.”
38 Monique Clement, “Choke points and censorship: Protecting free flow of information on internet,” Arizona State University, September 10, 2018, 
<https://ui.asu.edu/content/choke-points-and-censorship-protecting-free-flow-information-internet> (accessed January 6, 2020).
39 Elizaveta Foht, “The Internet could be jammed during rallies in Moscow at the request of security forces” [in Russian], BBC, August 6, 2019, <https://
www.bbc.com/russian/features-49255791> (accessed January 6, 2020).
40 Ivana Kottasová, Sara Mazloumsaki, “The ‘internet as we know it’ is off in Iran. Here’s why this shutdown is different,” CNN, November 19, 2019, <https://
edition.cnn.com/2019/11/19/middleeast/iran-internet-shutdown-intl/index.html> (accessed January 6, 2020).
41 David Belson, “The Migration of Political Internet Shutdowns,” Oracle Dyn, November 28, 2019, <https://dyn.com/blog/the-migration-of-political-
internet-shutdowns/> (accessed January 6, 2020).
42 See note 14: Article 14² of “Federal Law No. 90-FZ.”
43 Ibid.
44 Ibid.
of the network and thus prevent information that is 
critical of the government from entering or spread-
ing within the country.
In the past, several deliberate internet shutdowns 
have occurred in different countries on differ-
ent scales. An intentional local shutdown is theo-
retically possible in any country with a weak legal 
system – because it can be pushed through with 
little juridical resistance. For example, one such 
shutdown took place in August 2019 during ral-
lies in the center of Moscow; the BBC claims it was 
requested by law enforcement agencies.39 In Novem-
ber 2019, Iran cut off most of its internet for several 
days. However, this nationwide shutdown was only 
possible because the country relies on data connec-
tions through choke points40 and has a very limit-
ed number of ISPs, which are all state-controlled. 
In contrast to Iran, Russia has more than 40 provid-
ers on its borders, many ISPs, and – for now – no 
large choke points. These parameters had made any 
major internet shutdown in Russia hard to execute.41 
The new amendments, however, create a new legal 
basis for just such a scenario, thus enhancing the 
probability of a shutdown.
3. The Implementation of a Russian National Do-
main Name System (DNS)
This key amendment concerns the creation of a Rus-
sian national Domain Name System (DNS), which is 
due to be implemented by January 2021.42 It aims “to 
ensure a stable and safe use of domain names on the 
territory of the Russian Federation.”43 The Russian 
national domain zone will be composed of its own 
infrastructure, which means root servers and propri-
etary domain names. Roskomnadzor is again vested 
with enormous power: it will define regulations on 
the national DNS, requirements for it, and the pro-
cedure for its establishment, as well as the rules for 
its use. It will also determine the list of domain name 
groups constituting the Russian national domain 
system.44
Russia has more than 
 40 providers on its  
borders, and – for now –  
no large choke points
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The creation of a proprietary national DNS has nev-
er been successfully achieved by any country. It is 
therefore very hard to predict if such a system could 
work in parallel to the worldwide DNS in current use, 
which is allocated and managed by the Internation-
al Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers 
(ICANN). A national DNS would only make sense if 
a country opts for a long-term and complete isola-
tion of its internet. If Russia manages to implement 
the new amendments providing for the control of 
all networks and servers on its own territory and al-
lowing for their disconnection from the global inter-
net, it would then need its own domain name system. 
This would segregate Russian websites from the in-
ternational DNS, making them unavailable in all oth-
er parts of the world. At the same time, Russia would 
likely become unable to use the global DNS. 
Aspiring to Independence from ICANN
In an explanatory note about Russia’s new law on the 
“sovereign internet,” the Russian legislature claims 
that it was created in light of “the aggressive nature 
of the US National Cyber Security Strategy adopt-
ed in September 2018.”45 In it, the US accuses Rus-
sia – along with China, Iran, and North Korea – of 
using “cyber tools to undermine [its] economy and 
democracy, [and to] steal [its] intellectual property.”46 
Furthermore, the document states that the Unit-
ed States will punish those who use cyberattacks 
against them.47 According to the explanatory note, 
Russia needs to take “protective measures to ensure 
the long-term and stable operation of the internet in 
Russia, and to increase the reliability of Russian in-
ternet resources.”48 
But it would be misleading to consider Russia’s new 
internet legislation as a mere reaction to the US Na-
tional Cyber Security Strategy of 2018. Since 2012, 
Russia has been actively criticizing ICANN’s domi-
nant position in coordinating the global DNS, allo-
cating IP addresses, and governing the internet.49 In 
parallel, Russia is pushing for an alternative internet 
governance model with strong state sovereignty and 
45 “The Sovereign Internet law has been passed” [in Russian], State Duma, April 16, 2019, <http://duma.gov.ru/news/44551/> (accessed January 6, 2020).
46 “National Cyber Strategy of the United States of America,” The White House, September 2018, p. 1, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/
uploads/2018/09/National-Cyber-Strategy.pdf> (accessed January 6, 2020).
47 Ibid., p. 3.
48 See note 45: “The Sovereign Internet law has been passed.”
49 “Russia backtracks on internet governance proposals,” BBC, December 11, 2019, <https://www.bbc.com/news/20676293> (accessed January 6, 2020).
50 Adi Robertson, “New World Order: is the UN about to take control of the internet?”, The Verge, November 29, 2012, <https://www.theverge.
com/2012/11/29/3706352/un-itu-talks-dubai-guide> (accessed January 6, 2020).
51 “Why is America giving up control of ICANN?”, The Economist, September 30, 2016, <https://www.economist.com/the-economist-
explains/2016/09/29/why-is-america-giving-up-control-of-icann> (accessed January 6, 2020).
52 “List of Root Zone Servers,” IANA, https://www.iana.org/domains/root/servers (accessed January 6, 2020).
53 “List of Root Servers”, Root Servers, <https://root-servers.org/> (accessed January 6, 2020).
within the framework of the International Telecom-
munication Union (ITU) of the United Nations.50 
Russian fears of getting cut off from the internet ex-
pressed in the explanatory note are not fully plau-
sible. First and foremost, because ICANN is an in-
dependent organization,51 interference from the 
US government is legally almost out of the ques-
tion. Moreover, the US government is most likely not 
technically capable of shutting down domains relat-
ed to Russian websites. The worldwide DNS is man-
aged by IANA (the Internet Assigned Numbers Au-
thority), a function of ICANN located in California. 
Top Level Domains (TLDs) like .ru or .de are stored 
on so-called root zone files. These files, which are 
managed by ICANN and can be considered the back-
bone of the internet, are primarily stored on 13 root 
zone servers worldwide – ten of which are located 
in the US, and one each in the Netherlands, Sweden, 
and Japan.52 But TLD files are also stored on many 
other name servers.53 If the 10 root servers on US soil 
are modified so that the domains of Russian web-
sites are redirected, for example, there are still three 
other root servers and all the name servers left. As 
soon as manipulation of the root zone files is detect-
ed, DNS providers can stop the mirroring process 
from US root servers. Hence, all the remaining DNS 
servers would still have the files which grant access 
to the Russian domain names. Consequently, even if 
Russia is pushing for  
an alternative internet 
governance model with 
strong state sovereignty
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almost all the root servers are located in the USA, a 
shutdown of TLDs related to Russian websites by the 
US government is not a realistic scenario.54 
Against this background, it seems as though the aim 
of this new amendment is not to defend the inter-
net in Russia from outside attacks, but rather a pro-
active step toward splitting its own national segment 
off from the infrastructure of the global internet in 
order to gain state sovereignty over it. First of all, 
a proprietary DNS would make Russia independent 
from ICANN,55 which the Kremlin sees as being dom-
inated by the USA. And – although technical imple-
mentation seems far from easy – a national DNS 
is the key part which would allow the state to cut 
off the domestic internet for the long term. Russia 
would then not have to cope with international traf-
fic and, thus, undesired information leaving or enter-
ing the country.
RUSSIA WILL LIKELY BUILD UP 
ITS PARTNERSHIP WITH CHINA
Russia’s ambitions to build a model of state-backed 
internet control, create its own national DNS, and set 
new rules in cyberspace only make sense if it teams 
up with other countries. It remains to be seen how 
many countries would want to join its experiment. 
However, Russia already has a longstanding relation-
ship with China when it comes to the internet. Both 
countries have had several high-level meetings on 
cybersecurity and internet control.
In May 2015, Russia and China signed a bilater-
al agreement on cooperation in the field of inter-
national information security56 and defined a broad 
range of forms in which such cooperation could take 
place. The agreement includes the “creation of com-
munication channels and contacts to jointly respond 
to threats,” “exchange of information on the legisla-
tion of the states on ensuring information security,” 
54 Roman Goncharenko, “Russia moves toward creation of an independent internet,” Deutsche Welle, January 17, 2018, <https://www.dw.com/en/russia-
moves-toward-creation-of-an-independent-internet/a-42172902> (accessed January 6, 2020).
55 Ibid.
56 “Agreement between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the People’s Republic of China on cooperation in ensuring 
international information security” [in Russian], Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, May 8, 2015, <https://www.mid.ru/foreign_policy/
international_contracts/2_contract/-/storage-viewer/bilateral/page-42/43921> (accessed January 6, 2020).
57 Ibid.
58 “Joint statement between the presidents of China and Russia,” China Daily, June 26, 2016, <https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2016-06/26/
content_25856778.htm> (accessed January 6, 2020).
59 See “Sixty-sixth session, Item 93 of the provisional agenda, Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of 
international security, A/66/359,” United Nations General Assembly, September 14, 2011, <https://undocs.org/A/66/359> (accessed January 6, 2020); and 
“Sixty-ninth session, Agenda item 91, Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security, A/69/723,” 
United Nations General Assembly, January 13, 2015, <https://undocs.org/A/69/723> (accessed January 6, 2020).
60 “MTS and Huawei to Develop 5G in Russia” [in Russian], RBK, June 5, 2019, <https://www.rbc.ru/technology_and_
media/05/06/2019/5cf7d7ab9a79475b30e51df3> (accessed January 6, 2020).
61 Dimitri Simes, “Russia and Huawei team up as tech cold war deepens,” Nikkei Asian Review, October 28, 2019, <https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/
and “interaction in the development and promotion 
of international law standards to ensure national and 
international information security.”57 
Additionally, in June 2016, Vladimir Putin and Xi Jin-
ping signed the joint statement on cooperation in in-
formation space development. Both leaders stress 
they “uphold as always the principle of respecting 
national sovereignty in information space,” and “ex-
plore the possibilities of developing universal rules of 
responsible behavior in the information space with-
in the UN framework.”58 Indeed, China has often sup-
ported Russia’s initiatives in setting rules in cyber-
space within the UN framework.59 
A Sino-Russian cooper-
ation could lead to the 
fracturing of the  
global internet 
Such cooperation with China can be beneficial for 
Russia’s ambitions in the internet in both domestic 
and international politics in a number of ways. First 
of all, Russia’s divergence from the West means it 
might need technology from China; in fact, it is al-
ready striking deals with Chinese companies. In June 
2019, for example, Huawei signed – in the presence 
of President Vladimir Putin and President Xi Jin-
ping – a contract with MTS, one of the biggest Rus-
sian telecom companies, to develop Russia’s 5G net-
work.60 Just a couple of months later, they jointly 
launched the first 5G test zone in Moscow.61  
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Secondly, Russian authorities can benefit from Chi-
na’s experience in internet regulation and surveil-
lance when it comes to implementing its new legisla-
tion on internet control. According to press reports, 
Roskomnadzor and its Chinese counterpart – the 
Cyberspace Administration of China – are going to 
cooperate in countering the spread of prohibited 
information.62  
Cooperation between Moscow and Beijing does not, 
however, automatically mean that the Russian au-
thorities can simply imitate China’s procedures in 
blocking undesired traffic. As already mentioned, 
given the fact that China began its isolation process 
and the implementation of its so called “Great Fire-
wall” in the early days of its participation in the in-
ternet, the structure of China’s network is, for now, 
very different from Russia’s, which has been fully in-
tegrated into the global, decentralized internet from 
the outset. While the Chinese internet has only very 
few cross-border traffic exchange hubs, Russia’s has 
many – some of which are not even on the radar of 
its state authorities.63 
Furthermore, as China has its own global internet 
services, it does not rely on YouTube, WhatsApp, 
Google, or Facebook. In Russia, the US companies 
Google and Facebook currently provide some of the 
most widely used internet platforms.64 Many of these 
companies operate on an international level. Google, 
International-relations/Russia-and-Huawei-team-up-as-tech-cold-war-deepens> (accessed January 6, 2020).
62 “Roskomnadzor will sign an agreement with China’s Internet regulator” [in Russian], RBK, October 8, 2019, <https://www.rbc.ru/
rbcfreenews/5d9cad499a7947c9c1a6d665> (accessed January 6, 2020).
63 Alexandra Prokopenko, “Russia’s Sovereign Internet Law will kill innovation,” Carnegie Moscow Center, April 19, 2019, <https://carnegie.ru/
commentary/78946> (accessed January 6, 2020).
64 “Top Websites ranking in the Russian Federation,” SimilarWeb, November 1, 2019, <https://www.similarweb.com/top-websites/russian-federation> 
(accessed January 6, 2020).
65 “Discover our data center locations,” Google Data Centers, <https://www.google.com/about/datacenters/locations/> (accessed January 6, 2020).
66 Maria Kolomychenko, “Russian Security Council instructed to create an ‘independent internet’ for the BRICS countries” [in Russian], RBK, November 28, 
2017, <https://www.rbc.ru/technology_and_media/28/11/2017/5a1c1db99a794783ba546aca?from=main> (accessed January 6, 2020).
for instance, stores user data on many different serv-
ers worldwide,65 making them hard to regulate. Be-
cause Russia’s society and economy rely so heavily 
on services such as social networks, search engines, 
financial services, and Software as a Service (SaaS), 
replacing foreign ones with domestic versions seems 
to be a nearly insurmountable task. Simply shutting 
down foreign platforms would also have tremendous 
negative consequences for the economy and likely 
generate social outrage.
In addition, Russia needs to partner with China at 
the international level to promote the idea of state 
sovereignty in cyberspace. As previously suggest-
ed, Russian fragmentation from the global internet 
would only make sense if the country had allies with 
whom it could establish a parallel network. In No-
vember 2017, it became known that Russia’s Securi-
ty Council instructed the Ministry of Communica-
tions and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to develop 
ideas for a separate internet infrastructure and its 
own DNS root server system for the BRICS countries 
– Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa – in-
dependent from ICANN.66 Successfully establishing a 
regional segment of the internet will depend on Rus-
sia and China developing a network infrastructure 
which can be sustained without the architecture of 
the global internet. As yet, it is difficult to predict if 
they will succeed. It is also still unclear to what ex-
tent it will be attractive for other countries to shut 
themselves off from the global internet. Howev-
er, with the new legislation, Russia has created a le-
gal framework whose implementation must be tak-
en seriously.
RECOMMENDATIONS 
First, Germany and the EU should begin assessing 
the risks and long-term implications of Russia’s new 
internet legislation for European companies and civ-
il society actors in a timely manner. The EU needs a 
clear understanding of Russia’s dependence on the 
internet ecosystem, its technical capability, and its 
political goals in order to differentiate between the 
officially proclaimed goals of the Russian state and 
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its real intentions – which is, in turn, a prerequisite 
for taking appropriate action.
Second, EU institutions need to consider taking ac-
tive steps to protect the companies and civil soci-
ety actors of EU member states operating in Rus-
sia from disadvantages created by the Putin regime’s 
new regulations. The European Commission with its 
geopolitical focus and ambitions could play a par-
ticularly key role in creating and implementing such 
measures.
Third, the German government could play an im-
portant role in advocating for an open and free in-
ternet. Concretely, Germany should add coordinat-
ing support for the existing multi-stakeholder model 
of internet governance to the tasks of its upcoming 
EU presidency, which begins in the second half of 
2020. Standards for transnational legal regulations, 
for example, need to be developed as soon as possi-
ble – particularly because the ongoing cooperation 
between China and Russia in filtering, controlling, 
and regulating the internet poses a real danger of 
segmenting the existing internet and shifting glob-
al power.
Finally, Germany and the EU should actively promote 
the advantages of the global internet and involve 
major stakeholders, civil society actors, and busi-
ness entities in a broad discussion on how to sustain 
and enhance its future. Ideally, they should devel-
op a common long-term strategy for preserving the 
internet in its current, non-segmented, truly global 
form, which would involve widening the scope of ex-
isting platforms such as the United Nations’ Internet 
Governance Forum.
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